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In attitude research, behaviors are often used as proxies for attitudes and attitudinal processes. This practice is 
problematic because it conflates the behaviors that need to be explained (explanandum) with the mental constructs that 
are used to explain these behaviors (explanans). In the current article, we propose a meta-theoretical framework that 
resolves this problem by distinguishing between two levels of analysis. According to the proposed framework, attitude 
research can be conceptualized as the scientific study of evaluation. Evaluation is defined not in terms of mental 
constructs but in terms of elements in the environment, more specifically, as the effect of stimuli on evaluative responses. 
From this perspective, attitude research provides answers to two questions: (1) Which elements in the environment 
moderate evaluation? (2) What mental processes and representations mediate evaluation? Research on the first question 
provides explanations of evaluative responses in terms of elements in the environment (functional level of analysis); 
research on the second question offers explanations of evaluation in terms of mental processes and representations 
(cognitive level of analysis). These two levels of analysis are mutually supportive, in that better explanations at one level 
lead to better explanations at the other level. However, their mutually supportive relation requires a clear distinction 
between the concepts of their explanans and explanandum, which are conflated if behaviors are treated as proxies for 
mental constructs. The value of this functional-cognitive framework is illustrated by applying it to four central questions 
of attitude research.  
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Attitudes are typically conceived of as mental entities 
that have a profound impact on behavior. In social 
psychology, the construct of attitude is commonly 
considered to be the “most distinctive and indispensable 
concept” (Allport, 1935, p. 798), because “understanding 
attitudes is the first step to understanding human 
behavior” (Conrey & Smith, 2007, p. 718). Attitude 
researchers therefore aim to develop and test theories 
about the mechanisms by which attitudes are formed and 
activated, the manner in which they are represented, and 
the processes by which they influence behavior. Toward 
this end, researchers often treat behavioral effects as 
proxies for attitudes and attitudinal processes. For 
example, responses on an evaluative rating scale are 
frequently equated with the mental attitude that is 
assumed to underlie these responses (Krosnick, Judd, & 
Wittenbrink, 2005). Similarly, evaluative priming effects 
are often equated with the automatic activation of 
attitudes through processes of spreading of activation 
(e.g., Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986).  
Although the use of behavioral effects as proxies for 
attitudes and attitudinal processes is rather common, it is 
well known that this practice can be problematic for 
theory construction and the interpretation of empirical 
data (see Fazio, 2007; Krosnick et al., 2005). In the first 
part of this article, we review these problems and argue 
that they can be traced back to confounds at the 
conceptual level. Specifically, we argue that using a 
behavioral effect as a proxy for a mental construct 
presupposes the validity of a priori assumptions about 
how the mental construct is related to the behavioral 
effect. If these assumptions turn out to be false, problems 
arise for theorizing that is based on these assumptions. 
Yet, despite the widespread awareness of these issues, a 
closer look at the attitude literature reveals that it is still 
common practice to equate behavioral effects and mental 
constructs. We believe that one reason for this 
discrepancy is the absence of a general, phenomenon-
independent framework that avoids such conceptual 
conflations.  
The main goal of the current article is to resolve the 
problem of proxies in attitude research by proposing an 
overarching framework that (1) conceptually separates 
attitudinal effects and explanatory mental constructs and 
(2) encompasses many, if not all, effects that are studied 
in attitude research. In the second part of this article, we 
outline the conceptual basis of our meta-theoretical 
framework: the definition of evaluation as the effect of 
stimuli on evaluative responses. Based on this definition, 
different attitudinal phenomena can be conceptualized as 
instances of evaluation involving different kinds of 
moderators. In the third part, we explain how this 
overarching conceptualization leads to a comprehensive 
alternative for the use of proxies in attitude research by 
revealing two mutually supportive levels of analysis: (1) 
a functional level that focuses on the environmental 
moderators of evaluation and (2) a cognitive level that 
investigates the mental processes and representations 
that mediate evaluation.1 In the fourth part, we illustrate 
the implications of our functional-cognitive framework 
for theory construction and the interpretation of 
empirical data by applying it to four central questions of 
attitude research. Finally, the last part addresses some 
questions about our functional-cognitive framework to 
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avoid potential misunderstandings about its central 
arguments and implications. One such potential 
misunderstanding concerns the primacy of the two levels 
of analysis. To be clear from the outset, we do not claim 
that the functional level is primary to, can replace, or is 
in any way superior to the cognitive level of analysis in 
attitude research. Instead, we believe that the two levels 
of analysis mutually support each other, in that progress 
at the functional level can strengthen the cognitive level 
and vice versa. However, this mutually supportive 
relation can be realized only to the extent that attitude 
researchers consistently avoid using behavioral proxies 
for mental constructs by separating to-be-explained 
effects from explanatory mental constructs. Defining 
attitudinal effects in terms of evaluation allows attitude 
researchers to do so.  
On the Pitfalls of Treating Behaviors as Proxies for 
Mental Constructs 
What Is the Problem That We Are Trying to Solve? 
Although prominent scholars have repeatedly 
outlined the pitfalls of equating behavioral effects with 
mental constructs (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 2007; Fazio, 
2007; Krosnick et al., 2005), the use of behaviors as 
proxies for attitudes and attitudinal processes is still very 
common. For example, in research on attitude-behavior 
relations, a person’s behavioral response on an 
evaluative rating scale is often treated as a proxy of this 
person’s attitude toward an object and his or her object-
related actions in real-life situations are treated as 
behavioral instances that may or may not be influenced 
by the attitude (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). This practice 
serves as the foundation for research guided by the 
theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991), which 
represents one of the most influential research programs 
in social psychology. Yet, despite the widespread use of 
this practice, it is important to realize that a given 
behavior can be treated as a proxy for a mental construct 
only by virtue of a priori assumptions about how the 
mental construct is related to that behavior (De Houwer, 
2011; Poldrack, 2006). Specifically, the practice of using 
behavior as a proxy for mental constructs presupposes 
that the presence and properties of the relevant behavior 
(e.g., response on an evaluative rating scale) directly 
reflect the presence and properties of the mental 
construct that is thought to underlie the behavior (e.g., 
attitude). In technical terms, treating behavior as an 
index of a particular mental construct requires a bi-
conditional relation between the two, such that variations 
in one unambiguously reflect variations in the other (i.e., 
“if p then q” and, at the same time, “if q then p”). 
However, most attitude researchers agree that such 
claims of bi-conditional relations are untenable, because 
variations in attitudes are neither necessary nor sufficient 
to produce variations in attitude-relevant behavior 
(Krosnick et al., 2005). On the one hand, variations in 
attitudes are not necessary because attitude-relevant 
behavior can be influenced by various other factors. On 
the other hand, variations in attitudes are not sufficient 
because attitudes may not always be expressed in 
attitude-relevant behaviors. For example, doubts have 
been raised about the usefulness of evaluative judgments 
as direct indices of attitudes, because evaluative 
judgments can be influenced by various other factors 
(e.g., transient mood states; see Schwarz, 1990) and the 
impact of attitudes on evaluative judgments can 
sometimes be disrupted (e.g., when people are motivated 
to conceal their attitudes; see Fazio, 2007). Similarly, 
evaluative priming effects can provide an unambiguous 
index of automatically activated attitudes only if 
variations in automatically activated attitudes are both 
necessary and sufficient to produce variations in 
evaluative priming. Yet, priming effects are influenced 
by various factors over and above automatically 
activated attitudes (e.g., processes involved in response 
interference; see Gawronski, Deutsch, LeBel, & Peters, 
2008) and the impact of automatically activated attitudes 
on evaluative priming can be reduced under certain 
conditions (e.g., through strategic counteraction; see 
Teige-Mocigemba & Klauer, 2013). 
These considerations are relevant not only when 
probing mental representations, such as attitudes, but 
apply also when behavioral effects are used as proxies 
for the operation of particular attitudinal processes. As 
an example, consider the spreading-of-alternatives effect, 
which describes the phenomenon that choosing between 
two equally attractive alternatives leads to more 
favorable evaluations of chosen as compared to rejected 
alternatives (Brehm, 1956). Drawing on Festinger’s 
(1957) theory of cognitive dissonance, this effect is often 
interpreted as an index of post-decisional dissonance. 
Specifically, it is assumed that people experience an 
aversive feeling of post-decisional dissonance when they 
recognize either (1) that the rejected alternative has 
positive features that the chosen alternative does not 
have, or (2) that the chosen alternative has negative 
features that are not present in the rejected alternative. 
To reduce this uncomfortable feeling of cognitive 
dissonance, people are assumed to emphasize or search 
for positive characteristics of the chosen alternative and 
negative characteristics of the rejected alternative, which 
in turn leads to more favorable evaluations of the chosen 
compared with the rejected alternative.  
Although the contribution of post-decisional 
dissonance to the spreading-of-alternatives effect has 
been confirmed in a substantial number of studies, 
treating this effect as a proxy of cognitive dissonance 
presupposes that the presence versus absence of the 
effect is diagnostic for  the presence versus absence of 
cognitive dissonance (i.e., “if p then q” and, at the same 
time, “if q then p”). Yet, assuming such a bi-conditional 
relation seems problematic, because post-decisional 
dissonance is neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
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spreading-of-alternatives effect to occur. It is not 
necessary, because the spreading-of-alternatives effect 
can emerge in the absence of cognitive dissonance as a 
result of mere ownership (Gawronski, Bodenhausen, & 
Becker, 2007) or simple methodological factors (Chen & 
Risen, 2010). Moreover, it is not sufficient, because 
cognitive dissonance can be resolved in many ways other 
than attitude change (Festinger, 1957). Nevertheless, the 
mere emergence of a spreading-of-alternatives effect is 
often interpreted as an index of cognitive dissonance, 
including prominent claims of post-decisional 
dissonance in children and monkeys (Egan, Santos, & 
Bloom, 2007) and amnesic patients who do not even 
remember their choice (Lieberman, Ochsner, Gilbert, & 
Schacter, 2001).  
More generally, uncertainty about the mental causes 
of a particular behavior in a given situation creates 
uncertainty about whether the presence of that behavior 
provides a valid indicator of the presence of a particular 
mental construct. Furthermore, uncertainty about the 
mental causes of the behavior can be reduced only if 
there are other behavioral indices that are known to be 
perfect indicators of the presence of particular mental 
constructs (for a discussion of these issues, see Bechtel, 
2005; Chiesa, 1994; De Houwer, 2011; Poldrack, 2006). 
This dilemma creates a “catch-22” situation that seems 
virtually impossible to resolve.  
In essence, the use of behavioral proxies for mental 
constructs is problematic because it conflates the 
behaviors that need to be explained (explanandum) with 
the mental constructs that are used to explain these 
behaviors (explanans). In a strict sense, scientifically 
sound explanations are supposed to keep the explanans 
conceptually independent of the explanandum, such that 
the explanans should not refer to the concepts of the 
explanandum and vice versa (Hempel, 1970). Treating 
attitude-relevant behaviors as indices of mental attitudes 
or attitudinal processes ignores the distinction between 
the behaviors that need to be explained and the mental 
constructs that are supposed to explain these behaviors. 
A common result of this practice are logical fallacies in 
theory construction and the interpretation of empirical 
data, such as backward inferences and the fallacy of 
affirming the consequent (i.e., inferring the presence of 
“p” from the presence of “q” on the basis of the 
conditional “if p then q”; see Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, in press).  
What Can We Do About It?  
One option to deal with these problems is to treat 
certain behaviors as “tentative” proxies of mental 
attitudes and attitudinal processes. Unfortunately, such a 
strategy can hamper theory construction (see De 
Houwer, 2011). For example, if a certain behavior is 
treated as a tentative proxy for a particular mental 
construct, theorizing about this construct can be distorted 
when variations in that behavior are due to mental 
constructs other than those it is thought to capture (e.g., 
when the spreading-of-alternatives effect is due to 
mechanisms other than cognitive dissonance). Moreover, 
using behaviors as tentative proxies can undermine 
advances in theorizing by directing researchers’ attention 
away from alternative mechanisms that may produce the 
same behavioral effects (e.g., when mere ownership is 
ignored as a potential cause of the spreading-of-
alternatives effect).  
A better solution, we would argue, may be found at 
the conceptual level. As we noted above, the use of 
behavioral proxies for mental constructs is problematic 
because it conflates the behaviors that need to be 
explained (explanandum) with the mental constructs that 
are used to explain these behaviors (explanans). Such a 
conflation can be eliminated by defining the to-be-
explained effects independently from explanatory mental 
constructs. Although prominent scholars have raised 
related arguments before (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 2007; 
Fazio, 2007), violations of this principle are still very 
common in the attitude literature. We believe that one 
reason for this discrepancy is the absence of an 
overarching meta-theoretical framework that avoids 
conceptual conflations of behavioral effects and mental 
constructs in a way that is applicable to a wide range of 
attitudinal phenomena. Until now, those researchers who 
defined attitudinal effects without referring to mental 
constructs often did so by simply describing the 
superficial properties of the independent and dependent 
variables that are involved in the effect at hand. For 
instance, instead of equating evaluative priming with the 
automatic activation of attitudes through processes of 
spreading of activation (e.g., Fazio et al., 1986), one can 
define it as faster responding to targets when they are 
preceded by primes with the same valence compared to 
primes with a different valence. Although such a 
definition does not refer to explanatory mental constructs 
and thereby avoids a conflation of effect and mental 
construct, it is a relatively concrete definition that is 
couched in terms that refer only to the procedure 
typically used in evaluative priming studies. In the 
following section, we go beyond such idiosyncratic non-
mental definitions by proposing a comprehensive, 
unifying way to define all attitudinal effects in non-
mental terms. More specifically, we define attitudinal 
effects functionally as instances of evaluation. After 
explaining the core concepts of our approach and how 
they relate to attitudinal effects and mental constructs, 
we discuss the advantages of our approach and illustrate 
the implications of our framework for attitude research.  
Attitude Research as the Study of Evaluation 
The basis of our meta-theoretical framework is the 
concept evaluation, which we define in functional, non-
mental terms as the impact of stimuli on evaluative 
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responses. In this section, we discuss the meaning of the 
concept evaluative response, explain our definition of 
evaluation, and illustrate how attitudinal phenomena can 
be conceived of as instances of evaluation.  
What Are Evaluative Responses?  
We propose that attitude research can be 
conceptualized as being concerned with a particular 
category of behaviors that we refer to as evaluative 
responses. This conceptualization implies a distinction 
between behavioral responses that are evaluative and 
those that are not. From a methodological perspective, 
there are at least two ways in which such a distinction 
can be made.  
First, the decision can be made on the basis of 
scientific convention. For some responses, such as self-
reported evaluative responses (e.g., the number circled 
on a rating scale ranging from very unpleasant to very 
pleasant) or particular kinds of facial muscle actions 
(e.g., smiling versus frowning), consensus amongst 
researchers might be relatively easy to reach. Yet, for 
other kinds of responses, such as response latencies in 
performance-based paradigms (e.g., facilitation scores 
obtained in an evaluative priming task), consensus about 
whether these responses should be regarded as evaluative 
responses may be more difficult to achieve (see Arkes & 
Tetlock, 2004, for an example). 
  Second, the decision can be based on the results 
of empirical validation research, which serves to support 
(or not) the relevant arguments in cases lacking 
consensus in the scientific community. For example, 
responses that are correlated with other responses that 
are thought to be evaluative in nature (e.g., self-reported 
evaluative responses) and that are influenced by stimuli 
that are known to evoke evaluative responses (e.g., 
normatively pleasant or unpleasant stimuli) could be 
considered as evaluative. Ultimately, however, the 
second approach depends on the first one (i.e., decision 
based on convention), because its validation criteria 
involve a reference to existing conventions. After all, 
relating a particular kind of response to another response 
that is thought to be evaluative requires consensus about 
the evaluative nature of the latter. Similarly, testing 
whether a particular kind of response is influenced by 
stimuli that are known to evoke evaluative responses 
presupposes that the evaluative quality of these stimuli 
has been established by means of another response that 
is consensually considered as evaluative.  
Interpreted in this manner, definitions of the concept 
evaluative response are arbitrary insofar as they depend 
on scientific conventions about the criteria that can be 
used to distinguish evaluative from non-evaluative 
responses. However, whatever criteria are used to make 
this distinction, our meta-theoretical framework 
presupposes that these criteria do not refer to mental 
constructs such as attitudes (e.g., defining evaluative 
responses as responses that are caused by attitudes). 
Instead, evaluative responses should be identified on the 
basis of physical or functional properties (e.g., responses 
that serve to increase or decrease the physical distance to 
the relevant object). Evaluative responses could either 
have those physical or functional properties themselves 
or be correlated with responses that have those properties 
(as established in validation research). Our meta-
theoretical framework is consistent with any such 
conceptualization to the extent that it does not refer to 
mental constructs. As we pointed out earlier, a definition 
of evaluative response that refers to mental constructs 
such as “attitudes” would violate the conceptual 
independence of explanans and explanandum, thereby 
reintroducing the problems that we aim to resolve. Note 
also that defining evaluative responses in terms of 
attitudes does not allow one to escape the question of 
how the physical or functional features of evaluative 
responses (i.e., the subset of behaviors that attitude 
research focusses on) differ from those of other 
responses. Such a mental definition leaves open the 
question of what it is about evaluative responses that 
makes them susceptible to attitudes whereas other 
responses are not. To answer this question in a non-
circular manner (i.e., without referring to attitudes), 
reference has to be made to differences between the 
physical or functional properties of evaluative and non-
evaluative responses.  
What Is Evaluation?  
Expanding on the notion of evaluative response, we 
define evaluation as the causal effect of stimuli on 
evaluative responses. Defined in this manner, 
propositions about the occurrence of evaluation involve 
three components: (1) a statement about the presence of 
an evaluative response, (2) a statement about the 
presence of a stimulus, and (3) a statement about a causal 
link between the two. Whereas the presence of a 
stimulus and an evaluative response can most often be 
observed, a causal relation between the two has to be 
inferred. In many cases, it can be difficult to determine 
whether an evaluative response has been caused by a 
particular stimulus, because there are many stimuli that 
could be responsible for the evaluative response. This 
situation is not much different for individuals 
themselves, in that it can be rather difficult to discern the 
true environmental causes of one’s own evaluative 
responses (Wilson & Dunn, 2004). 
Although philosophers and psychologists debated for 
centuries about how causality can be inferred (e.g., 
Cheng, 1997; Hume, 1739/1987; Kant, 1781/1965; Sosa 
& Tooley, 1993), there is general agreement that the 
experimental method provides a useful tool to establish 
the presence of a causal relation. For example, attitude 
researchers can compare evaluative responses between 
an experimental and a control condition that differ only 
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with regard to the presence of a particular stimulus 
(property). If the evaluative response is different in the 
experimental condition than in the control condition, one 
can conclude that the stimulus (property) had a causal 
effect on the evaluative response, and thus that 
evaluation of the stimulus (property) has occurred. 
The statement that a stimulus is the cause of a given 
behavior merely implies that the behavior is a function 
of that stimulus (functional causation); it does not 
commit itself to any ideas about the processes by which 
the stimulus influences behavior (e.g., as the result of a 
specific force or mechanism; see Chiesa, 1992, for a 
detailed discussion). The presence of the stimulus can be 
conceived of as an independent variable that determines 
the dependent variable that is behavior. Of course, 
researchers often make theoretical assumptions about the 
mental mechanisms that mediate functional relations 
(mechanistic causation), but it is important to realize that 
functional causes can be identified even when the 
mediating mechanism is unknown. For instance, 
provided that adequate control conditions are 
implemented, experimental studies on evaluative 
priming allow one to determine whether the speed of 
responding to target stimuli is determined by the relation 
between the prime and the target or by the relation 
between the prime and the required response (see De 
Houwer, 2003). Although such experiments may have 
important implications for cognitive theories of 
evaluative priming, it is possible to formulate 
conclusions about the functional relations without 
knowing the mental processes by which prime-target or 
prime-response relations influence the speed of 
responding to the targets.  
Attitudinal Phenomena as Instances of Evaluation 
The functional definition of evaluation allows one to 
systematically define in a functional, non-mental manner 
a wide range of the behavioral phenomena that are 
studied in attitude research. As such, the concept 
evaluation forms the conceptual basis of the 
comprehensive meta-theoretical framework that we were 
looking for. More specifically, we propose that different 
attitudinal phenomena involve different instances of 
evaluation or different moderators of evaluation. For 
example, evaluative ratings can be defined as the effect 
of stimuli on one particular type of evaluative response, 
namely the selection of a valenced stimulus (e.g., a value 
on an evaluative rating scale). Evaluative priming can be 
conceived of as an instance of evaluation that involves a 
different type of evaluative response, being the time 
needed to respond to a valenced stimulus (e.g., a positive 
or negative target word). The spreading-of-alternatives 
effect (i.e., choosing between two equally attractive 
alternatives leads to a more favorable evaluation of the 
chosen as compared to rejected alternatives) could be 
seen as a demonstration of the moderating impact of a 
contextual factor (i.e., a choice between certain 
alternatives) on evaluation. Importantly, because 
evaluation implies only functional causation, it can be 
moderated not only by elements of the environment that 
are present when the evaluative response is observed but 
also by the history of the organism. For example, the fact 
that a stimulus evokes positive rather than negative 
evaluative responses in the present may be attributed to 
pairings of that stimulus with other (positive) stimuli in 
the past (e.g., De Houwer, 2007). In a similar way, many 
other behavioral phenomena that are studied in attitude 
research can be said to involve evaluation, that is, some 
kind of stimulus that evokes some kind of evaluative 
response in a particular organism and a particular 
context. Although they all involve evaluation, different 
phenomena can be distinguished on the basis of the kind 
of stimulus, evaluative response, organism, and context 
that are involved. We will provide more detailed 
examples of these functional definitions of behavioral 
phenomena later in this article.  
The main advantage of adopting our functional 
conceptualization of attitudinal phenomena is that it 
provides a systematic way to avoid the conflation of to-
be-explained behavioral effects and explanatory mental 
constructs. It allows us to define a wide variety of 
attitudinal effects without reference to mental constructs, 
thereby going far beyond the idiosyncratic non-mental 
definitions that have been proposed in the past (e.g., 
evaluative priming as better performance when target 
and prime have the same valence). Thus, a major 
contribution of our conceptualization is that it provides a 
unifying perspective entailing that all attitude research is 
concerned with the study of evaluation. This overarching 
conceptualization sheds light not only on what different 
attitudinal phenomena have in common, but also on the 
differences between these phenomena. There is, 
however, an important additional benefit of our 
conceptualization. Because we have defined evaluation 
in functional, non-mental terms, and because we did this 
in a manner that is applicable to a wide variety of 
attitudinal phenomena, our conceptualization helps to 
identify two distinct, yet mutually supportive, levels of 
analysis in attitude research. These two levels of 
analysis, as well as their interaction, are described in the 
following section.  
Toward a Functional-Cognitive Framework for 
Attitude Research 
Defining attitudinal phenomena as instances of 
evaluation allows researchers to clearly delineate and 
relate two levels of analysis in attitude research: (1) a 
functional level of analysis that provides explanations of 
evaluative responses in terms of stimuli in the 
environment, and (2) a cognitive level of analysis that 
offers explanations of evaluation in terms of mental 
processes and representations.  
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Functional Level of Analysis 
Our definition of evaluation as the causal impact of a 
stimulus on evaluative responses implies that statements 
about evaluation go beyond mere observations. Rather, 
statements about evaluation are theoretical in the sense 
that they imply a causal hypothesis about which element 
in the environment is responsible for an observed 
evaluative response. To illustrate this issue, imagine that 
you attend a talk during a conference. During the talk, 
you see a member of the audience smiling. If you as an 
observer conclude that the smile reflects a positive 
evaluation of the content of the talk, then you put 
forward the hypothesis that the content of the talk is the 
functional cause of the smile. However, it is also 
possible that the smile was elicited by other elements in 
the (current or past) environment (e.g., the way in which 
the speaker dresses). In this case, the smile would no 
longer qualify as an evaluation of the content of the talk. 
Thus, statements about evaluations are not “mere” 
descriptions of observations, but instead represent 
hypothetical functional explanations of evaluative 
responses.  
Attitude researchers usually test their hypotheses 
about a causally effective stimulus (property) by 
studying naturally occurring or experimentally produced 
covariations between the stimulus (property) and 
evaluative responses (e.g., by comparing the effects of 
Black vs. White face primes in an evaluative priming 
task). Such investigations fit within the functional 
approach in psychology that aims to explain behavior by 
identifying its environmental causes (see Chiesa, 1992, 
1994). Learning more about the conditions under which 
attitudinal effects occur helps us to understand how 
evaluative responses are determined by the environment. 
In functional explanations, variations in evaluative 
responses represent the events that need to be explained 
(explanandum) and elements in the environment serve as 
the entities that explain these events (explanans). Thus, 
functional explanations respect the general scientific 
principle that the explanandum needs to be separated 
conceptually from the explanans.  
There is also another way in which functional 
explanations go beyond “mere” description. Functional 
hypotheses about the cause of an evaluative response can 
differ in their level of sophistication. At a low level of 
sophistication, one can describe causal effects in terms 
that are linked directly to a specific procedure (e.g., 
evaluative priming as the impact of words on the speed 
of responding to other words). More sophisticated 
explanations use abstract terms that can be applied to a 
well-delineated subset of different situations or elements 
of situations (i.e., terms that have a broad scope and, at 
the same time, a high level of precision; see Hayes, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Wilson, 2012). Functional 
researchers strive towards sophisticated functional 
explanations because they can reveal similarities and 
differences between different effects that would 
otherwise remain hidden. Our definition of evaluation 
fits well with this aim because it has a scope and level of 
precision that allows for more sophisticated functional 
explanations of attitudinal phenomena than idiosyncratic 
explanations of individual effects that are unrelated to 
the epistemic goals of attitude researchers (e.g., 
evaluative priming as the impact of stimuli on the speed 
of responding to other stimuli). 
Another important goal of functionally oriented 
attitude research is to identify environmental conditions 
that moderate the effect of a given stimulus feature on 
evaluative responses. These moderators may include 
prior experiences with the stimulus (stimulus history), 
the presence of other stimuli (stimulus context), and the 
nature of the evaluative response. For example, 
researchers interested in racial prejudice may investigate 
whether the effect of racial outgroup faces on evaluative 
responses is moderated by prior contact with outgroup 
members (e.g., Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), features of the 
context in which these faces are encountered (e.g., 
Barden, Maddux, Petty, & Brewer, 2004), and the type 
of task that is used measure evaluative responses (e.g., 
Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995). These 
moderators do not have to be studied in isolation, but can 
also be investigated for interactive effects. For example, 
researchers may be interested in whether the moderating 
effects of intergroup contact differs as a function of the 
type of evaluative response that is recorded and features 
of the context in which those evaluative responses are 
observed.  
The overarching goal of functionally oriented 
research is to generate increasingly abstract explanations 
of evaluative responses that stipulate in an accurate (i.e., 
in line with the observed data), unambiguous (i.e., using 
concepts that leave little room for misunderstandings), 
and economical way (i.e., using as few concepts and 
assumptions as possible) the conditions under which 
elements of the environment cause and moderate 
evaluative responses. This abstract knowledge goes 
beyond a simple list of individual empirical facts (e.g., 
findings in single experiments) in that it is assumed to 
apply to a wide range of situations within and outside of 
the laboratory. Thus, the ultimate challenge for 
functional research is to derive from a large set of 
empirical observations those common elements that are 
crucial in moderating evaluation. At the same time, 
purely functional research is limited in its focus, in that it 
is primarily concerned with the question of when 
evaluation occurs (i.e., moderators of evaluation); it does 
not direct itself toward understanding how evaluation 
occurs (i.e., mediators of evaluation). The latter question 
is central to the cognitive level of analysis.  
Cognitive Level of Analysis  
When attitude research is conceived of as the study 
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of evaluation, cognitive attitude theories can be 
conceptualized as hypotheses about the mental processes 
and representations that mediate evaluation. All 
cognitive attitude theories have in common the 
assumption that a stimulus can cause an evaluative 
response only by virtue of mental representations that are 
formed and activated by stimuli in the environment and 
that influence behavior by virtue of certain mental 
processes. Yet, this minimal assumption does not go 
beyond the basic claim that effects of stimuli on 
behavior can be explained by mediating mental 
processes and representations, which is the bedrock of 
cognitive science. Various concepts have been used to 
refer to these mediating mental processes and 
representations. Although all definitions are to some 
extent arbitrary and open to debate, our meta-theoretical 
framework implies that a clear distinction should be 
made between concepts at the mental level and concepts 
at the functional level. In other words, concepts should 
be defined either at the functional level (e.g., evaluation) 
or the mental level (e.g., attitude).  
Using mental constructs, cognitive attitude theories 
aim to describe mental mechanisms that explain (1) why 
a given stimulus has the capacity to cause a particular 
evaluative response, and (2) why the effect of the 
stimulus on evaluative responses is moderated by 
particular environmental conditions. Thus, whereas the 
functional level of analysis provides explanations of 
evaluative responses (explanandum) in terms of stimuli 
in the environment (explanans), the cognitive level of 
analysis offers explanations of evaluation (explanandum) 
in terms of mental processes and representations 
(explanans).  
The merit of cognitive attitude theories can be 
evaluated on the basis of whether they (1) account for 
existing knowledge about the environmental conditions 
that moderate evaluation (i.e., heuristic value) and (2) 
lead to the discovery of new knowledge about the 
environmental conditions that moderate evaluation (i.e., 
predictive value). For example, the hypothesis that 
evaluation is based on the activation of nodes in 
associative networks (e.g., Fazio, 2007) has merit 
because it correctly predicts that stimuli can cause 
evaluative responses automatically (because activation in 
the network can spread automatically through 
associations). Because the structural characteristics that 
maximize the heuristic versus predictive value of a given 
theory can sometimes be in conflict (e.g., when a theory 
accounts for everything, yet predicts nothing; see Quine 
& Ullian, 1978), an empirically confirmed hypothesis is 
typically assigned more value when it is made before 
(i.e., predictive value) rather than after (i.e., heuristic 
value) the hypothesized effect has been observed.  
Importantly, this way of testing cognitive attitude 
theories provides an alternative to testing those theories 
by using proxies. In other words, our conceptualization 
of attitude effects as instances of evaluation not only 
provides a comprehensive way to avoid treating those 
effects as proxies for mental constructs; it also removes 
the need for proxies of mental constructs in testing 
cognitive attitude theories. To illustrate the difference 
between the proxy approach and our alternative 
approach, again take the example of associative network 
theories. The presence of an evaluative priming effect is 
often interpreted as a proxy of the automatic activation 
of attitudes via spreading of activation in an associative 
network. Hence, the emergence of an evaluative priming 
effect is typically viewed as a demonstration of this 
process. Within our conceptual framework, however, 
observing an evaluative priming effect is merely an 
instance of evaluation (i.e., the impact of the prime on 
the speed of emitting an evaluative response) that occurs 
under certain conditions (e.g., when the prime is 
presented only briefly and immediately before the 
target). The fact that such an effect occurs is in line with 
the idea that attitudes are stored as evaluative 
associations in an associative network through which 
activation can spread automatically. However, the 
consistency between theory and data does not guarantee 
the absence of another cognitive theory that allows for 
evaluation under those conditions. Hence, the 
observation that an evaluative priming effect occurs 
under certain conditions can never be treated as proof of 
the hypothesis that a specific mental process (e.g., 
spreading of activation) occurs under those conditions 
(cf. Gawronski & Bodenhausen, in press). Doing so 
would imply that the effect is a proxy of a specific 
process. Nevertheless, knowledge about when evaluative 
priming occurs constrains theories of the mental 
processes that mediate evaluative priming effects. A 
theory of evaluative priming should be able to account 
for the fact that evaluative priming occurs under certain 
conditions. This example illustrates that the more we 
know about the conditions under which evaluation 
occurs, the more we can constrain theoretical ideas about 
the mental processes and representations that mediate 
evaluation (see Jacoby & Sassenberg, 2011). Moreover, 
the higher the constraints that are imposed by an 
individual finding, the stronger will be the conclusion 
that can be reached at the cognitive level. In most cases, 
however, it is more likely that multiple findings are 
needed to achieve such progress. In any case, our 
framework implies that the validation of cognitive 
attitude theories can be achieved by testing the 
conditions under which evaluation occurs rather than by 
simply searching for behavioral effects that provide 
proxies for mental processes. 
As we noted earlier, behavioral effects and mental 
constructs can be separated also by adopting 
idiosyncratic definitions of attitudinal effects. Again 
consider an idiosyncratic definition of evaluative 
priming as faster responses when prime and target have 
the same rather than opposite valence. Such a definition 
would allow one to investigate moderators of the 
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evaluative priming effect, and to use this information to 
inform the development of cognitive theories of 
evaluative priming, without making any a priori 
assumptions about whether and how mental processes 
such as spreading of activation are related to evaluative 
priming effects. This idiosyncratic approach would be a 
major improvement to the common practice of equating 
evaluative priming effects with mental processes such as 
spreading of activation. However, because our approach 
is much more comprehensive, it has several advantages 
compared to an idiosyncratic approach. When defining 
effects such as evaluative priming in idiosyncratic terms, 
one runs the risk that both research on the moderators of 
the effect and mental process theories about the 
mediators of the effect also become very idiosyncratic, 
that is, effect-specific. Functional research on the 
moderators of the effect will be limited to examining 
when this particular effect occurs. Likewise, mental 
process theories about the effect will focus on 
accounting for the functional knowledge about when that 
specific effect occurs. As a result, both functional and 
cognitive attitude research becomes fractionated. Within 
our approach, it is still possible to examine separately 
when and how a given effect arises, but it is also possible 
to relate different attitudinal phenomena in functional 
terms, that is, as instances of evaluation. As such, our 
conceptualization provides a comprehensive and 
overarching framework for research on evaluation in 
general (rather than for research on individual attitudinal 
effects). In addition to providing such an overarching 
framework, our conceptualization encourages 
researchers to determine in a systematic manner for each 
attitudinal phenomenon how it can be defined 
functionally as an instance of evaluation. In that way, the 
framework can help to detect instances in which 
attitudinal effects are not defined functionally and hence 
to reveal hidden theoretical assumptions in the definition 
of those effects.  
The Mutual Relation between Functional and 
Cognitive Explanations 
Our discussion of the way in which cognitive 
theories are evaluated on the basis of their heuristic and 
predictive value indicates that functional explanations 
and cognitive explanations are not in competition, but 
mutually support each other (Bechtel, 2005; De Houwer, 
2011). Progress in functional explanations of evaluative 
responses (i.e., knowledge about the elements in the 
environment that determine evaluative responses) 
provides the empirical basis that is necessary to develop 
and test cognitive explanations of evaluation (i.e., 
knowledge about the mental mechanisms by which 
stimuli produce evaluative responses). Vice versa, 
progress in cognitive explanations of evaluation can lead 
to progress in functional explanations of evaluative 
responses by organizing existing knowledge about the 
elements in the environment that determine evaluative 
responses (i.e., heuristic value) and through the 
generation of new predictions about elements in the 
environment that might influence evaluative responses 
(i.e., predictive value). However, this mutually 
supportive relation between functional and cognitive 
explanations can succeed only if the two levels of 
explanation are separated conceptually, because they 
differ in terms of their explanandum (i.e., variations in 
evaluative responses vs. variations in evaluation) and in 
terms of their explanans (i.e., elements in the 
environment that moderate the causal effect of stimuli on 
evaluative responses vs. mental processes and 
representations that mediate the causal effect of stimuli 
on evaluative responses). We refer to this meta-
theoretical framework of conceptually distinct, but 
mutually supportive, functional and cognitive levels of 
analysis as the functional-cognitive framework for 
attitude research.  
We want to emphasize that there is no fixed 
hierarchy between the two levels of analysis in terms of 
their scientific importance. Which level is given primacy 
depends on philosophical considerations (for an 
overview of the philosophical underpinnings of the 
functional and cognitive approach in psychology, see 
Chiesa, 1992, 1994; Gardner, 1987; Hayes, 1995). Yet, 
regardless of which level of explanation is preferred by 
an individual researcher, it is important to note that 
progress at one level of explanation is tightly connected 
to progress at the other level of explanation. Therefore, 
both functionally and cognitively oriented researchers 
can benefit from embracing both levels of explanation. 
Moreover, an integrative focus combining both 
functional and cognitive explanations can avoid potential 
problems resulting from an exclusive focus on one type 
of explanation, as we will explain in the final section of 
this article. 
Putting the Functional-Cognitive Framework to 
Work 
In the previous section, we briefly explained in 
general terms how functional research on evaluation can 
lead to progress in cognitive attitude theories, and vice 
versa. In the present section, we provide more concrete 
examples of how a functional-cognitive approach can 
promote progress in attitude research. Toward this end, 
we will focus on four core questions in traditional 
attitude research: (1) How are attitudes acquired? (2) 
How are attitudes activated? (3) How do attitudes 
influence behavior? (4) How are attitudes represented? 
We argue that each of these questions relates to 
functional knowledge about particular moderators of 
evaluation, that is, to specific sets of conditions under 
which evaluation does or does not occur. In each case, 
we illustrate how our conceptualization can solve 
problems that have resulted from the use of behavioral 
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proxies for mental constructs. 
The Acquisition of Attitudes: Varying the Nature of 
the Stimulus History 
Theories about the acquisition of attitudes are 
constrained primarily by findings about changes in 
evaluation. More specifically, one can argue that a new 
attitude has been acquired if two conditions are met. 
First, it needs to be verified that a stimulus initially 
evokes a particular evaluative response, but a different 
evaluative response at a later point in time.2 Second, this 
change in evaluation needs to be the result of 
experiences that are somehow related to this stimulus. 
The second condition distinguishes the acquisition of 
attitudes from the spontaneous development or 
emergence of attitudes (e.g., because of genetic factors; 
see Olson, Vernon, Harris, & Jang, 2001). This 
conceptualization implies that research on the acquisition 
of attitudes focuses on the conditions under which prior 
experiences with a stimulus determine the nature of the 
evaluative response that is evoked by that stimulus. 
Insights into the acquisition of attitudes can be achieved 
by comparing at different moments in time evaluations 
of one stimulus or by comparing at one moment in time 
evaluations of stimuli that differ only with regard to 
certain prior experiences. For example, stimuli can differ 
with regard to whether they were experienced before (as 
is the case in studies on mere exposure; see Bornstein, 
1989, for a review), whether they co-occurred with other 
valenced stimuli (as is the case in studies on evaluative 
conditioning [EC]; see De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 
2001, for a review), or whether they were described in a 
positive or negative manner in verbal statements (as in 
the studies on persuasive communication; see Crano & 
Prislin, 2006, for a review). Importantly, the observed 
change in evaluation is not treated as a proxy for a 
specific mental process (e.g., formation of associations, 
see below) but merely as a behavioral effect that 
constrains cognitive theories on attitude acquisition. 
Conceptualized in this manner, the goal of research 
on the acquisition of attitudes is twofold. First, it aims at 
examining the environmental conditions under which 
prior experiences moderate evaluation. For example, one 
can examine whether the effect of stimulus pairings on 
evaluative responses (i.e., EC effect; see De Houwer, 
2007) depends on aspects of the stimulus pairings (e.g., 
whether they appear simultaneously or sequentially; see 
Sweldens, Van Osselaer, & Janiszewski, 2010), the 
stimuli as such (e.g., how salient they are; see Jones, 
Fazio, & Olson, 2009), the type of evaluative response 
that is registered (e.g., evaluative ratings or evaluative 
priming; see Gawronski & LeBel, 2008), or the broader 
context during the presentation of the stimulus pairings 
(e.g., whether participants are engaged in other tasks; see 
Pleyers, Corneille, Yzerbyt, & Luminet, 2009). The 
second aim is to develop cognitive theories that describe 
the mental mechanisms by which prior experiences 
moderate evaluation (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2006; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Thus, research on the 
acquisition of attitudes represents a particular segment of 
our functional-cognitive framework, namely the segment 
that deals with the moderating effect of the history of 
stimuli on evaluative responses.  
Conceptualizing attitude acquisition in this manner 
offers an alternative to the use of behavioral proxies for 
mental constructs. As argued earlier, behavioral effects 
have often been used as proxies for mental processes that 
were assumed to underlie the acquisition of attitudes. 
Consider, for example, research on EC. EC is often 
conceived of as a mental process by which the pairing of 
stimuli automatically and gradually results in the 
formation of associations in memory (e.g., Petty & 
Briñol, 2010). As discussed in more detail by De 
Houwer (2007), defining EC in this manner restricts 
theoretical ideas about EC to those that refer to 
automatic association formation. However, recent 
evidence raises doubts about the widespread assumption 
that EC can occur unconsciously and thus about the idea 
that automatic association formation mediates EC (for a 
meta-analysis, see Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, 
Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). When the definition of EC 
as a process of automatic association formation is taken 
seriously, such evidence would lead to the conclusion 
that EC does not exist and should therefore not be 
studied.  
The framework that we propose in this article makes 
a clear distinction between EC as a behavioral effect and 
the mental processes that might underlie this effect. 
Hence, evidence against a particular mental process 
theory of EC cannot be mistaken as evidence against EC 
as an effect. Moreover, it allows one to take seriously the 
idea that EC effects may be due to several mental 
processes, including processes that do not involve the 
automatic formation of associative links (De Houwer, 
2007; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011). For example, 
it has been proposed that EC effects might often result 
from the non-automatic acquisition and truth evaluation 
of propositional knowledge about stimulus relations (De 
Houwer, 2009a; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 
2009), which is supported by the results of a recent 
meta-analysis (Hofmann et al., 2010). The idea that EC 
effects can be produced by different types of mental 
processes also sheds light on many conflicting results 
that have been observed in the literature (De Houwer, 
2007; Sweldens et al., 2010).  
Although the proposal to define EC as an effect was 
put forward some years ago (see De Houwer, 2007), our 
functional-cognitive framework encompasses many 
other effects. As such, it reveals that EC is concerned 
with one type of moderator of evaluation, being the 
stimulus history. Within the class of effects that deals 
with stimulus history, EC is unique in that it concerns 
one specific type of experience (i.e., stimulus pairings; 
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see De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, & Moors, in press). 
There are many other effects that also deal with changes 
in evaluation but that concern other types of experiences 
(e.g., mere exposure effects as a change in evaluation 
that is due the repeated presentation of a stimulus).  
The functional-cognitive approach can be applied not 
only to EC but also to these other effects. Consider the 
recently introduced self-referencing effect (e.g., 
Prestwich, Perugini, Hurling, & Richetin, 2010; see also 
Ebert, Steffens, von Stülpnagel, & Jelenec, 2009, for a 
related proposal). In studies on the self-referencing 
effect, participants are asked to respond to stimuli from 
four categories by pressing one of two keys. For 
instance, Prestwich et al. (2010) asked participants to 
press a left key when they saw pictures of a novel Drink 
A or words related to the self (e.g., me, I) and to press a 
right key when pictures of a novel Drink B or words 
related to others (e.g., they, he) were presented. As a 
result, Drink A was liked more than Drink B. Originally, 
the self-referencing effect was introduced as a type of 
EC because it was said to be “based on associating one’s 
self with a particular drink and others with a contrast 
drink” (Prestwich et al., 2010, p. 62). However, from a 
strict functional point of view, the two effects differ 
because the change in liking is due to other types of 
experiences. Whereas EC refers to changes in evaluation 
that are due to the pairing of stimuli in space and time, 
the self-referencing effect involves changes in evaluation 
that result from assigning the same discriminative 
function to stimuli (i.e., the function of signaling that a 
particular response should be selected; see Perugini, 
Richetin, & Zogmaister, 2012). Based on this functional 
analysis, we are now exploring a whole new class of 
effects in which evaluation changes as the result of 
overlap in different kinds of functions. For instance, in 
one as yet unpublished experiment, participants 
experienced that a first response was followed by a 
positive stimulus on some trials and by a neutral 
stimulus A on other trials. The second response was 
sometimes followed by a negative stimulus and 
sometimes by a neutral stimulus B. As a result of this 
procedure, neutral stimulus A was subsequently liked 
more than neutral stimulus B. Hence, also an overlap in 
outcome function (e.g., the positive stimulus and 
stimulus A both function as an outcome of the first 
response) can lead to a change in liking. The discovery 
of these new effects was a direct consequence of 
functional analyses of EC and the self-referencing effect.  
The Activation of Attitudes: Varying the Nature of 
the Stimulus Context 
From a cognitive perspective, one could argue that 
evaluation as an effect can occur only if some kind of 
attitudinal representation has been formed, activated, and 
influences behavior.3 Hence, cognitive theories about the 
activation of attitudes are constrained by knowledge 
about the environmental conditions that moderate 
evaluation. Traditionally, however, certain classes of 
moderators are excluded from this research. Most 
importantly, prior experiences should be kept constant 
between conditions, because differences in prior 
experiences could influence the attitude itself rather than 
the activation of the attitude. This ambiguity is the 
reason why most studies on the activation of attitudes 
focus on how properties of the momentary context 
moderate evaluation.4 For example, one can test whether 
a stimulus elicits different evaluative responses 
depending on the presence versus absence of other 
stimuli in the environment (e.g., Gawronski, Rydell, 
Vervliet, & De Houwer, 2010). Other properties of the 
context that can be manipulated are whether participants 
are asked to provide their response under time pressure 
(e.g., Ranganath, Smith, & Nosek, 2008) or the extent to 
which participants can discriminate above chance-level 
between the presence versus absence of the response-
evoking stimulus (e.g., Ottati, Coats, Mae, DeCoster, & 
Smith, 2010). Ideally, the effects of these variables 
should generalize across different types of evaluative 
responses to make sure that the contexts influenced the 
activation of the attitude, rather than the impact of the 
attitude on behavior.5  
Again, we want to point out that observing an effect 
of context on evaluation does not provide a proxy for 
any single attitude activation process. It only provides 
information about the moderators of evaluation, which in 
turn contributes to the cognitive level by constraining the 
mental process theories that are possible at that level. 
Hence, from the perspective of the functional-cognitive 
framework, research on the activation of attitudes has 
two aims: (1) to describe whether and when certain 
aspects of the stimulus context moderate evaluation, and 
(2) to develop cognitive theories that explain why these 
contextual factors moderate evaluation in that manner.  
As is the case for research on the acquisition of 
attitudes, the functional-cognitive approach provides an 
alternative for the use of proxies for mental constructs in 
research on attitude activation. As an example, consider 
the literature on implicit and explicit attitudes. A 
common assumption in this literature is that implicit 
attitudes are activated automatically upon the encounter 
of a stimulus, whereas explicit attitudes require 
controlled processes to be retrieved from memory (e.g., 
Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). To the extent that 
indirect, performance-based measures (e.g., evaluative 
priming tasks) reduce participants’ opportunity to engage 
in controlled processing, responses on indirect measures 
are often treated as an index of implicit attitudes, 
whereas responses on direct self-report measures are 
equated with explicit attitudes (e.g., Greenwald & 
Banaji, 1995).  
 Such a use of proxies can, however, hamper 
attitude research in several ways. Mental states such as 
attitudes influence behavior on a given task only by 
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virtue of task-specific mechanisms that translate the 
mental state into an overt behavioral response (see De 
Houwer, 2009b; Gawronski et al., 2008). Therefore, the 
absence of an evaluative response on an indirect measure 
might be due either to the fact that the implicit attitude 
was not activated or to the fact that it did not influence 
the observed response (e.g., Gawronski, Cunningham, 
LeBel, & Deutsch, 2010). Likewise, variables that 
influence evaluative responses on indirect measures 
might do so not because they influence the activation of 
implicit attitudes, but because they affect the 
mechanisms through which implicit attitudes influence 
behavior (e.g., Deutsch & Gawronski, 2009).  
We believe that research on implicit attitudes would 
benefit from conceptualizing it as the study of automatic 
evaluation. Whether, and the way in which, evaluation is 
automatic needs to be specified in terms of the impact of 
elements of the context on evaluation. For example, 
evaluation can be said to be automatic if it occurs even 
when the context has properties that could potentially 
reduce the likelihood of evaluation. More specifically, 
evaluation can be studied in contexts in which 
participants (1) are not instructed to respond in an 
evaluative manner to the evoking stimuli, (2) are 
instructed to prevent, stop, or alter the evaluative 
response that a stimulus evokes, (3) are instructed to 
engage in other difficult tasks, (4) are not able to 
discriminate between the presence or absence of the 
evoking stimuli, between the presence or absence of the 
causal impact of the stimuli on the evaluative response, 
or between the presence or absence of the evaluative 
response that is evoked by the stimulus, or (5) have little 
time to respond. If evaluation occurs under one or more 
of these conditions, it can be described as automatic. 
Another approach would be to avoid using the term 
automatic as an umbrella concept and refer directly to 
the conditions themselves. If, however, one choses to 
continue to use the concept automatic, one should 
recognize that it only makes sense to do so only if one 
always specifies the conditions to which the concept 
automatic is meant to refer in that specific instance  (De 
Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009).6  
Once it has been established that a particular instance 
of evaluation is automatic in a certain sense, it can be 
further examined (1) what environmental conditions 
moderate automatic evaluation and (2) which mental 
processes mediate automatic evaluation. The functional-
cognitive approach thus allows one to clearly separate 
automatic evaluation as a behavioral effect and implicit 
attitudes as a mental construct that can be used to explain 
automatic evaluation. One could even entertain theories 
that dispense with the concept implicit attitudes as a 
separate mental entity to explicit attitudes (e.g., Fazio, 
2007). There is also no need to limit oneself to theories 
that invoke associations as an explanatory mental 
construct. Historically, research on implicit attitudes has 
almost always been conceptualized in terms of the 
cognitive process of spreading of activation via 
associations in memory, presumably because it provides 
a possible mechanism by which stimuli could 
automatically evoke evaluative responses (see Hughes, 
Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011, for a discussion). 
From a functional-cognitive perspective, however, it is 
entirely possible that non-associative processes mediate 
automatic evaluation. In line with this possibility, De 
Houwer (2013; Hughes et al., 2011) recently proposed 
that automatic evaluations might be driven by the 
automatic retrieval of propositional knowledge. Whereas 
associations involve simple unqualified links between 
mental representations, propositions include information 
about how events are related. De Houwer (2013) 
reviewed evidence showing that the automatic activation 
of propositional knowledge is a possible mechanism 
underlying automatic evaluation, as well as evidence in 
line with a propositional account of automatic 
evaluation. For instance, context information about how 
stimuli are related has been shown to moderate the 
impact of stimulus pairings on the automatic evaluation 
of those stimuli (e.g., Zanon, De Houwer, & Gast, 2012). 
These novel ideas and findings make perfect sense 
within (and were actually inspired by) a functional-
cognitive framework in which automatic evaluation is 
seen as an effect that can be due to different types of 
mental processes.  
The Effect of Attitudes on Behavior: Varying the 
Nature of the Evaluative Response 
In addition to the question of how attitudes are 
acquired and activated, there is the important question of 
how attitudes influence behavior (e.g., Ajzen, 1991; 
Fazio, 1990). As noted above, from a cognitive 
perspective, one could argue that evaluation as an effect 
can occur only if some kind of attitudinal representation 
is acquired, activated, and influences behavior. Given 
this assumption, cognitive theories about how attitudes 
influence behavior can be constrained by learning more 
about the effect of stimuli on different types of 
evaluative responses while keeping constant those 
factors that influence the acquisition (i.e., stimulus 
history) and activation (i.e., stimulus context) of 
attitudes. Hence, research on the impact of attitudes on 
behavior can be conceptualized in terms of how the 
nature of the evaluative response moderates evaluation. 
Consistent with our general approach, this conclusion 
does not imply that (the impact of the nature of the 
evaluative response on) evaluation is seen as a proxy for 
specific attitudes or specific processes by which attitudes 
influence behavior, because such an approach would 
require additional assumptions (e.g., that evaluation is 
determined only by those specific attitudes or processes).  
We believe that a clear separation between functional 
and cognitive levels of analysis could advance research 
on the relation between attitudes and behavior in 
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significant ways. In the past, attitude researchers have 
invested much effort in devising behavioral proxies of 
attitudes because they believed that these proxies, as 
attitude measures, would allow them to predict a wide 
variety of attitudinal behaviors (Krosnick et al., 2005). 
For example, a person’s evaluative response on a rating 
scale is often treated as a proxy of this person’s attitude 
toward a given object and his or her object-related 
actions in real-life situations as are treated as behavioral 
instances that may or may not be influenced by the 
attitude (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). However, there is no 
a priori reason that justifies the treatment of one 
evaluative response as a superior measure of attitudes 
(see Kaiser, Byrka, & Hartig, 2010). After all, it is also 
possible that object-related actions in real-life situations 
represent more reliable reflections of attitudes than 
responses on evaluative rating scales. In fact, there is no 
empirical way to support either of the two claims, 
because the ambiguity about which of the two behaviors 
is the more reliable indicator of attitudes can be resolved 
only if there are other behavioral indicators that are 
known to be perfect indicators of attitudes. As we 
outlined in our introduction, this problem creates a 
“catch-22” situation for the use of behavioral proxies 
that seems impossible to resolve. 
From the perspective of our functional-cognitive 
framework, the question of attitude-behavior consistency 
is not concerned with the consistency between a mental 
construct and behavior, but the consistency between the 
different types of behavior, more specifically, different 
types of evaluative responses. Interpreted in this manner, 
research on attitude-behavior consistency is focused on 
whether evaluation is moderated by the type of 
evaluative response that is observed. At the functional 
level, the primary aim is to investigate whether the same 
stimulus can elicit different responses for different kinds 
of evaluative responses (e.g., saying that one likes the 
stimulus but avoiding the presence of that stimulus). At 
the cognitive level, the main goal is to develop mental 
process theories that explain why the same stimulus can 
elicit functionally different types of evaluative responses.  
From a functional perspective, there are several 
reasons why effects of stimuli on one type of evaluative 
response might fail to covary with the effect of the same 
stimuli on another type of evaluative response. First, the 
two kinds of evaluative responses might be influenced 
by different stimuli or different features of a stimulus 
(see Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977). Consider, for example, the 
observation that the verbal endorsement of ecologically 
friendly products often fails to predict the purchase of 
those products (e.g., Vantomme, Geuens, De Houwer, & 
De Pelsmacker, 2005). This inconsistency might be due 
to the fact that verbal endorsement is determined 
primarily by whether the products are ecologically 
friendly whereas the actual purchase of those products is 
determined primarily by the visual attractiveness of 
those products (e.g., ecologically friendly but 
unfashionable clothes). Similarly, evaluative ratings 
might fail to predict other kinds of evaluative responses 
because the context is different during their registration. 
Returning to the example of ecologically friendly 
products, verbal endorsements might fail to predict 
purchase behavior if the context includes cues related to 
ecologically friendly behavior while giving the verbal 
endorsement, but such cues might be absent when people 
make a purchasing decision (e.g., Schuldt, Konrath, & 
Schwarz, 2011). Hence, progress in predicting particular 
instances of evaluation (e.g., purchasing behavior) on the 
basis of other instances of evaluation (e.g., evaluative 
ratings) can be achieved by carefully analyzing the 
elements in the environment that influence the two kinds 
of evaluative responses (see Kaiser et al., 2010). We 
contend, therefore, that important advances may be made 
by clearly distinguishing the functional and cognitive 
levels and by engaging in sophisticated functional 
analyses of the different instances of evaluation (i.e., 
analyses of what it is in the environment that influences 
the evaluative responses).  
Expanding on observed covariations between 
different instances of evaluation, the central task for 
cognitive attitude theories can be conceived of as the 
development of mental explanations of why certain types 
of evaluative responses to a given object covary while 
others do not. Ideally, these theories should also generate 
novel predictions that lead to the discovery of previously 
undetected covariations (or a previously undetected lack 
of covariation) between instances of evaluation that 
involve different evaluative responses (e.g., Dunton & 
Fazio, 1997). Within our functional-cognitive approach, 
the nature of the relation between attitudes and behavior 
(or lack thereof) is not something that needs to be 
explained (i.e., explanandum), but constitutes a cognitive 
hypothesis that is supposed to explain observed 
covariations between different instances of evaluation 
(i.e., explanans). For example, discrepancies between 
evaluative ratings of environmentally friendly products 
and the actual purchase of these products represent a 
behavioral event that needs to be explained, and this 
event may be explained by the hypothesis that evaluative 
ratings are mostly influenced by attitudes whereas the 
impact of attitudes on purchasing decisions depends on 
other factors that are unrelated to attitudes. However, in 
hypothesizing a lacking influence of attitudes on 
behavior as the explanans for discrepancies between 
different instances of evaluation, it is critical that the 
proposed explanation provides novel predictions about 
potential moderators of the observed discrepancy. 
Otherwise, such explanations involve the risk of 
explanatory circularity, in that discrepancies between 
two behaviors are interpreted as evidence for the 
ineffectiveness of attitudes in influencing one of these 
behaviors, but the only evidence for this assumption is 
the lacking covariation that needs to be explained in the 
first place. Thus, a clear distinction between the 
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functional and the cognitive levels of analysis, including 
their explanans and explanandum, can resolve the 
“catch-22” problem that is created by the use of 
behavioral proxies for mental attitudes.  
The Representation of Attitudes: All Possible 
Moderators of Evaluation 
The last three sections have focused on the mental 
processes that attitude theories aim to describe: those 
involved in the acquisition of attitudes, the activation of 
attitudes, and the impact of attitudes on behavior. 
However, a mental explanation is complete only if it also 
specifies the nature of the representations on which these 
processes operate. In fact, assumptions about the nature 
of mental representation impose important constraints on 
the nature of the mental processes that can operate on 
these representations (Smith & Queller, 2001). Because 
of these constraints, attitude researchers have rightfully 
devoted a lot of attention to the question of how attitudes 
are represented (for an overview, see Gawronski, 2007).  
Unfortunately, it is very difficult, if not impossible, 
to arrive at definite conclusions regarding the exact 
nature of mental representations (Wyer, 2007). Within 
the functional-cognitive framework, we can assume that 
there must be some kind of attitude toward a given 
stimulus if the presence of that stimulus causes an 
evaluative response. However, the mere occurrence of 
evaluation does not allow one to draw strong conclusions 
about how the attitude is represented (Greenwald & 
Nosek, 2009). The same is true for moderating effects on 
evaluation. Because mental representations always 
influence evaluation by virtue of mental processes, one 
can never be sure that a given moderator has an effect 
because attitudes are represented in a certain manner or 
because the mental processes that operate on attitudes 
have certain properties (Wyer, 2007). To illustrate this 
point, consider the longstanding debate in the attitude 
literature between proponents of the idea that attitudes 
are abstract summary representations that simply need to 
be retrieved from memory (e.g., Fazio, 2007) and 
researchers who argue that attitudes are constructed on 
the spot from concrete memories each time that an 
attitude object is encountered (e.g., Schwarz, 2007). The 
fact that evaluation often depends on the characteristics 
of the context seems to argue for the latter position, but 
is also compatible with the former position if it is 
assumed that contexts modulate which abstract 
representation is activated in response to a given 
stimulus (e.g., Fazio, 2007). This controversy resembles 
the debate between abstractive and exemplar-based 
representations in the cognitive literature, which some 
have argued is impossible to resolve (Barsalou, 1990). 
We argue that these epistemological problems should 
not stop researchers from speculating about the nature of 
the mental representations that underlie evaluation. After 
all, hypotheses about mental representation are a central 
component of cognitive attitude theories. However, the 
framework that we have put forward in this article entails 
a somewhat different perspective on debates about 
mental representations. First, according to the functional-
cognitive approach, the primary input for these debates is 
functional knowledge about the moderators of 
evaluation. In order for this knowledge to have a 
maximal impact on theories about attitude 
representation, moderating relations should be 
formulated as much as possible in terms that do not refer 
to mental processes or representations. A major 
contribution of our framework is to propose that these 
formulations can be achieved in a systematic and 
coherent manner by defining behavioral phenomena in 
terms of the moderators of evaluation. Second, although 
well-formulated hypotheses about the nature of mental 
representations have heuristic and predictive value, 
researchers should realize that it will be difficult to arrive 
at definite conclusions about the exact nature of the 
mental representations that mediate evaluation (e.g., 
Greenwald & Nosek, 2009). As outlined by prominent 
theorists in this domain, empirical findings that have 
been inspired by one theory of mental representation can 
almost always be re-described in terms of alternative 
theories (e.g., Wyer, 2007), which suggests that 
competing theories of mental representation rarely differ 
in terms of their utility in organizing existing knowledge 
(i.e., their heuristic value). Thus, in our view, the more 
important criterion in the evaluation of competing 
theories of mental representation is their utility in 
inspiring research that leads to new empirical discoveries 
(i.e., their predictive value).  
Third, and directly related to the last point, many 
theories of mental representation are rather abstract with 
a relatively low level of precision, which makes it 
difficult to determine which behavioral observations are 
consistent or inconsistent with these theories (for a 
discussion, see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, in press). 
The result is that these theories can explain almost every 
empirical finding in a post-hoc fashion (i.e., high 
heuristic value). Yet, they seem less suitable for making 
a priori predictions that could challenge these theories in 
the case of disconfirmation (i.e., low predictive value). 
As noted above, theories of mental representation should 
not only organize functional knowledge about 
evaluation, but also generate new functional knowledge 
by virtue of novel predictions about functional relations 
between stimuli and evaluative responses. An important 
implication of our functional-cognitive framework 
therefore is the call for conceptual precision at both 
levels of explanation, which will be helpful in 
maximizing the predictive value of theories of attitude 
representation. 
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Possible Questions about the Functional-Cognitive 
Framework 
Our functional-cognitive framework provides a meta-
theoretical conceptualization of attitude research that 
resolves several problems resulting from the use of 
behavioral proxies for mental constructs. Although many 
of its basic concepts have been directly adopted from 
traditional attitude research, it also involves several 
concepts that may be less familiar to some researchers 
(e.g., the notion of functional explanation; see Chiesa, 
1992; De Houwer, 2011; De Houwer et al., in press). 
Because these concepts require a different way of 
interpreting empirical data (e.g., interpreting attitudinal 
phenomena as instances of evaluation and their 
environmental moderators rather than direct reflections 
of mental attitudes), we anticipate that these differences 
will raise a number of questions regarding the premises 
and implications of our meta-theoretical analysis. In the 
remainder of this article, we address several issues to 
avoid potential misunderstandings about the central 
arguments and implications of our functional-cognitive 
framework.  
Does the Functional-Cognitive Framework Require a 
Change in the Way Attitude Research is Done? 
The functional-cognitive framework is a meta-
theoretical framework that has been developed to avoid 
theoretical pitfalls in the interpretation of empirical data 
and the construction and evaluation of attitude theories. 
Thus, adopting the functional-cognitive framework does 
not require any methodological changes in the way 
attitude research is conducted. In fact, we consider 
research on attitudes as one of the most impressive areas 
in social psychology in terms of its creativity, research 
design, methodological rigor, and data analysis. Our 
framework does, however, require a major change in the 
interpretation of empirical data. The cornerstone of our 
proposal is to conceptualize attitudinal phenomena in a 
coherent non-mental, functional way as instances of 
evaluation.  
What is New about the Functional-Cognitive 
Framework of Attitude Research? 
 The framework presented in this article builds upon 
our previous work in which we provided arguments for 
the need to separate behavioral effects and mental 
processes (e.g., De Houwer, 2007, 2011; Deutsch & 
Gawronski, 2009; Gawronski et al., 2008). Some of this 
work already provided non-mental definitions of specific 
attitudinal phenomena (e.g., EC; see De Houwer, 2007) 
while other work pointed to the mutually reinforcing 
nature of functional and cognitive levels of analysis in 
psychology in general (De Houwer, 2011; Hughes, 
Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011). The framework 
proposed in the current article integrates and extends this 
earlier work by providing a coherent and comprehensive 
way of defining attitudinal phenomena in functional 
terms. More specifically, we introduced the functional 
concept of evaluation and proposed the idea that a wide 
variety of attitudinal phenomena can be conceived of as 
instances of evaluation. Based on this conceptual 
innovation, we also put forward a functional-cognitive 
framework for attitude research. This framework 
provides a novel meta-theoretical perspective on attitude 
research that helps to avoid the well-known problems of 
using behavioral proxies for attitudes and attitudinal 
processes. 
Hasn’t Attitude Research Been Functional-Cognitive 
All Along? 
One might argue that attitude research has always 
been functional-cognitive in nature, in that it always 
focused on mental explanations of behavioral effects. 
We indeed believe that any cognitively oriented research 
necessarily involves a functional level of analysis. 
However, attitude research has been lacking a coherent 
and encompassing framework that (1) makes explicit the 
nature of and relation between the functional and 
cognitive levels of analysis and (2) does so in a 
conceptually sophisticated way that encompasses a wide 
variety of attitudinal phenomena. In fact, we believe that 
the absence of such an overarching framework is the 
primary reason why many attitude researchers continue 
to treat behavioral effects as proxies for mental 
constructs. By providing a functional-cognitive 
framework for attitude research, we offer the conceptual 
tools to optimize progress at both the functional and 
cognitive levels of analysis.  
Does the Functional-Cognitive Framework Endorse 
Radical Behaviorism? 
The central goal of functionally oriented attitude 
research is to provide explanations of evaluative 
responses in terms of stimuli in the environment. This 
endeavor resembles the notion of radical behaviorism 
(e.g., Skinner, 1938), in that both focus on stimulus-
response relations. Yet, radical behaviorism has been 
rejected by psychologists for several reasons (for a 
review, see Chiesa, 1994), which raises the question of 
whether the criticisms of radical behaviorism also apply 
to the functional-cognitive framework. The short answer 
to this question is: “No, it does not.” Whereas radical 
behaviorism rejects cognitive explanations, the 
functional-cognitive framework not only embraces 
cognitive explanations, but also illustrates the 
interdependent relation between functional and cognitive 
explanations (for more details, see De Houwer, 2011; De 
Houwer et al., in press). Functional explanations of 
evaluative responses provide the empirical input that is 
necessary to develop and test cognitive explanations of 
evaluation. Vice versa, progress in cognitive 
explanations of evaluation can advance functional 
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explanations of evaluative responses by organizing 
existing knowledge about the elements in the 
environment that determine evaluative responses (i.e., 
heuristic value) and through the generation of new 
predictions about elements in the environment that might 
influence evaluative responses (i.e., predictive value). In 
fact, an exclusive focus on cognitive explanations that 
does not consider its empirical roots in functional 
stimulus-response relations will be susceptible to the 
problems of behavioral proxies outlined in the beginning 
of this article. Conversely, an exclusive focus on 
functional explanations that does not consider the 
mediators of stimulus-response relations lacks any 
cognitive explanation for how those relations emerge. By 
integrating both functional and cognitive research in a 
single framework with two interdependent levels of 
analysis, the functional-cognitive framework avoids both 
problems. 
Is Functional Research Meant to Achieve 
“Objectivity”? 
Our suggestion to adopt non-mental, functional 
definitions of attitudinal phenomena may also raise the 
question of whether these definitions are meant to 
achieve “objectivity.” Again, the short answer to this 
question is: “No, they are not.” Functional definitions are 
not more or less objective than any other type of 
definition (Barnes & Roche, 1997; Chiesa, 1992). They 
are always theory-laden in the sense that they are shaped 
by the theories and concepts in the mind of the 
researcher (e.g., a researcher’s classification of different 
stimuli as belonging to the same category). Nevertheless, 
it is crucial that functional definitions of attitudinal 
phenomena do not refer to those mental constructs that 
are proposed to be in the mind of the participant (e.g., a 
participant’s attitude toward particular stimuli). 
Undoubtedly, concepts in the mind of the researcher 
have a significant impact on his or her classification of 
observations and his or her functional explanations of 
these observations. For the functional-cognitive 
framework, it suffices that the behavioral effects shown 
by a person are not defined in terms of the mental 
constructs that are proposed to explain these effects. 
Adopting functional definitions also does not result in 
“objectivist” attitude research in the sense that it would 
consider only the “objective” environment rather than a 
person’s subjective construal of the environment. As 
prominently explained by Ross and Nisbett (1991), the 
functional notion of situationism is perfectly consistent 
with the cognitive notion of subjective construal (see 
also Reis, 2008). Because each individual has a unique 
learning history, the same stimulus can have 
dramatically different effects for different individuals. 
Similarly, the same stimulus may have dramatically 
different effects for the same individual if the stimulus is 
encountered in different contexts. In fact, one of the 
main goals of attitude research, as conceptualized in 
functional-cognitive terms, is precisely to describe and 
explain the way in which individual learning histories 
and stimulus contexts moderate evaluation.  
Does the Functional-Cognitive Framework Simply 
Re-label Existing Constructs? 
Some readers may wonder if the functional-cognitive 
framework merely involves a re-labeling of existing 
constructs. Again the answer is: “No, it does not.” In our 
framework, it is essential that each construct is defined 
either at the functional level or at the cognitive level. For 
instance, the term evaluation refers to a strictly 
functional concept whereas the term attitude refers to a 
strictly cognitive concept. Ideas about attitudes can be 
used to explain why evaluation occurs under certain 
conditions and knowledge about the moderators of 
evaluation constrains ideas about attitudes, but the two 
should never overlap in an a priori manner. By insisting 
on this conceptual distinction, our framework helps to 
resolve the problems that arise from the use of 
behavioral proxies for mental constructs.  
Can We Investigate Cognitive Mediation with 
Statistical Mediation Analysis? 
If cognitive attitude theories are conceived of as 
propositions about the mediators of evaluation, one 
might wonder whether these propositions could also be 
tested by means of statistical mediation analysis, such as 
Baron and Kenny’s (1986) multiple regression approach 
or Preacher and Hayes’ (2004) bootstrapping method. 
The common idea underlying these procedures is that 
causal chains can be established by statistically 
controlling for a potential mediator (e.g., mental process) 
when testing the effect of a given distal factor (e.g., 
environmental stimuli). Although this approach has 
become one of the most important tools to test mediation 
in social psychology, it requires that the proposed 
mediator can be measured directly. Because we reject the 
use of behavior as a proxy for mental constructs, 
statistical mediation analysis does not provide a viable 
means to assess the merit of cognitive attitude theories. 
Instead, their merit has to be evaluated on the basis of 
their heuristic value (i.e., the extent to which they 
account for existing knowledge about the moderators of 
evaluation) and their predictive value (i.e., the extent to 
which they correctly predict previously unknown effects 
of moderators). In other words, theories about the 
cognitive mediators of evaluation have to be evaluated 
on the basis of their implications regarding the 
environmental moderators of evaluation (see Jacoby & 
Sassenberg, 2011). These conclusions resonate with 
earlier concerns by Spencer, Zanna, and Fong (2005) 
who suggested that experimental manipulations are often 
superior in establishing a causal chain compared with 
traditional regression-based approaches. In fact, the only 
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exceptions for which they deemed traditional regression-
based approaches as superior are cases in which the 
measurement of the proposed mediator is easy and 
manipulation of that mediator is difficult. Because the 
measurement of mental constructs requires a treatment of 
behavior as a proxy for these constructs, Spencer et al.’s 
(2005) conclusion implies that experimental 
manipulations are generally superior in testing 
hypotheses about the mediating role of mental 
constructs. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that 
regression-based approaches are well-suited for cases in 
which a behavior itself (e.g., relative frequency of 
drinking red versus white wine) is assumed to serve as 
the mediator for another behavior (e.g., self-reported 
preference for red over white wine), as is the case in self-
perception (Bem, 1967). 
Can Neuroscience Solve the Problem of Behavioral 
Proxies? 
A major development in research on attitudes is the 
growing interest in their neurological underpinnings (Ito 
& Cacioppo, 2007). From the perspective of the 
functional-cognitive framework, there are two ways in 
which neuroscientific research on attitudes can be seen 
as part of the study of evaluation. First, neurological 
responses (e.g., changes in electrical activity as captured 
by EEG; changes in bloodflow as captured by fMRI) can 
be conceptualized as a particular type of evaluative 
response next to other types such as verbal or motor 
responses (see De Houwer & Moors, 2010). From this 
perspective, one can examine whether and when a given 
stimulus leads to certain kinds of neurological evaluative 
responses. Second, environmental influences on the state 
of a participant’s brain are an important aspect of the 
broader stimulus context, because the brain is assumed 
to regulate most behavior. It is therefore interesting to 
examine whether evaluation is moderated by 
environmental influences on the neurological state of the 
participant (e.g., lesions in particular brain areas; 
transcranial magnetic stimulation of particular brain 
areas). Thus, from a functional-cognitive perspective, 
neuroscience can provide both dependent and 
independent variables for studies on evaluation. It can 
provide dependent variables in the form of novel kinds 
of evaluative responses. In addition, it can provide 
independent variables in the form of environmental 
factors that may moderate evaluation. In this manner, 
neuroscience can contribute to the development of 
mental theories of evaluation because it generates new 
functional knowledge that can be used to constrain 
mental explanations of evaluation. Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that neuroscientific data do not provide 
direct access to the mental constructs proposed by 
cognitive attitude theories (see also Poldrack, 2006). The 
meaning of neuroscientific data generally depends on 
their relation to behavior, which places them at the level 
of functional relations between stimuli and evaluative 
responses.  
Concluding Comments 
We started this article by reviewing the problems that 
arise from using behavior as a proxy for attitudes and 
attitudinal processes. In search of an alternative for this 
practice, we explored the idea that attitude research can 
be conceptualized as the study of the moderators and 
mediators of evaluation. Drawing on a functional 
definition of evaluation as the effect of stimuli on 
evaluative responses, we argued that attitude research 
provides answers to two questions: (1) Which elements 
in the environment moderate evaluation? (2) What 
mental processes and representations mediate 
evaluation? These functional and cognitive levels of 
analysis do not compete but mutually support each other. 
Although many of the reviewed problems inherent to the 
use of behavioral proxies are well-known to attitude 
researchers, the treatment of behavioral effects as direct 
indices of attitudes and attitudinal processes is still rather 
common. A potential reason for this paradox is the lack 
of an overarching, phenomenon-independent framework 
that provides an alternative to the use of behaviors as 
proxies for mental constructs. The current article aimed 
to fill this gap. We hope that our analysis revealed the 
benefits of the functional-cognitive framework for 
attitude research, and in this way will contribute to 
progress in this important domain of research. 
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Footnotes 
1 Note that we do not use the term functional in the 
sense of adaptive or something that serves a particular 
goal (e.g., Maio & Olson, 2000). Instead, the term is 
used to refer to relations between environment and 
behavior, that is, to functions that map the environment 
onto behavior. Moreover, the term cognitive is used in a 
broad sense that is synonymous with the term mental. It 
is supposed to refer to the complete set, rather than a 
subset, of all mental processes and representations, 
including affective and motivational constructs. 
2 The term attitude acquisition is meant to subsume 
both attitude change and attitude formation. Attitude 
change can be defined as a change in the particular 
quality of the evaluative response that is evoked by a 
stimulus as the result of new experiences related to that 
stimulus. It differs from attitude formation, in which the 
stimulus initially does not evoke an evaluative response 
and at a later time does evoke an evaluative response. 
Yet, both research on attitude change and research on 
attitude formation deal with the effect of new 
experiences, which is supposed to be captured by the 
term attitude acquisition. Like the study of attitude 
acquisition, research on the malleability of attitudes also 
deals with variations in the evaluative response that is 
evoked by a given stimulus. In this case, however, the 
focus is not on the moderating impact of new 
experiences with a stimulus, but on the way in which 
changes in context moderate evaluation.  
3 Some might argue that an attitude is involved only 
in instances of evaluation that involve a dispositional 
component that is stable over time (e.g., Eagly & 
Chaiken, 2007). Such a surplus meaning can be captured 
in functional terms by specifying the conditions under 
which attitudes are assumed to underlie evaluation (e.g., 
instances of evaluation that remain stable over time).  
4 The context may also contain other stimuli that 
influence evaluative responses directly and independent 
of the target object. For example, evaluative judgments 
about an object can be influenced by whether the 
judgments are registered on a sunny day or on a rainy 
day (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Within the 
functional-cognitive framework, effects of this kind 
represent behavioral effects that can be explained by 
referring to mental constructs such as mood. The critical 
difference is whether the context directly influences 
evaluative responses or instead moderates the causal 
effect of the target stimulus. 
5 Even though the activation of attitudes is typically 
studied through manipulations of the stimulus context, 
effects of the stimulus context are not diagnostic about 
differences in attitude activation when these effects are 
limited to particular types of evaluative responses. For 
example, the presence versus absence of other people 
may influence evaluative responses that are relatively 
easy to control (e.g., evaluative ratings), but not those 
that are relatively difficult to control (e.g., responses in 
an evaluative priming task). Such discrepancies between 
different types of evaluative responses represent the 
basis for studies on the impact of attitudes on behavior, 
which are discussed in more detail in the following 
section.  
6 Note that, in contrast to cognitive analyses of the 
concept automaticity (e.g., Bargh, 1992; Moors & De 
Houwer, 2006), we do not refer to mental constructs 
such as goals or mental resources in our definition of 
automaticity features (for more details, see De Houwer 
& Moors, in press). The reasoning behind this approach 
is that it remains agnostic with regard to specific theories 
about the mental processes that underlie automatic 
effects (e.g., particular assumptions about the nature of 
mental resources; see Baddeley, 2010).  
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